Ethical Realism

October 14, 2010

Does Human Life Have Value?

Filed under: ethics,philosophy — JW Gray @ 6:28 am
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Does human life have intrinsic value? I proposed in my master’s thesis, Two New Kinds of Stoicism, that it does in the sense that our consciousness has value. I will similarly argue here that we have some reason to believe that human consciousness has value, and there can be different qualities of consciousness that can have differing values. I will also present the major objections that have been raised against the view that human life has intrinsic value including a famous objection given by Darek Parfit.

What is human life?

I think there is an ambiguity in the term “human life.” I am not talking about human life as in a human body with a heartbeat. I am talking about human beings who actually have experiences. I am talking about human beings in a way that distinguishes them from other animals in a way interesting to philosophers. They are capable of learning language, they can do mathematics, and so on. A human being without experiences might be best described as “brain dead” rather than as a human life.

What it means for human life to have value.

The fact that human life has value is uncontroversial, but identifying what sort of value human life seems to have is not so easy. The fact that one person can be useful to another is not interesting. The fact that people care about each other is not interesting. What is interesting is the thought that we could have a real intrinsic value worth caring about whether or not we are useful to others. Some people call intrinsic value “desire-independent value” or “objective value.” If we have intrinsic value, then it’s good to merely for us to exist.

People commonly seem to think that we have intrinsic value. For example, we worry that killing people “to put them out of their misery” is wrong even when they will probably suffer for the little remaining time they have left. Additionally, we are often joyous when someone we know has a child. Something “miraculous” is believed to have been created.

If people have intrinsic value, then the more people that exist, the better. It’s good that you exist, and it’s good that I exist.

Some important questions remain:

  1. What is it about human life that makes it valuable?
  2. Do all animals have value?

What is it about human life that makes it valuable?

I can think of two plausible candidates: (a) consciousness, and (b) a holistic relation of our bodies and consciousness. It doesn’t seem to be our living bodies alone that have value. A brain dead person could be technically alive, but the lack of consciousness makes the person dead for all intents and purposes. The permanent loss of consciousness is a loss of intrinsic value.

Whether or not our minds are the source of intrinsic value or whether we have intrinsic value in a holistic sense (body and mind) is something I don’t yet know how to answer, and I don’t know if it can be answered. Part of the problem is that it might not be physically possible to separate consciousness from a living body. They might be equally part of a single human being.

Do all animals have value?

If it is consciousness (or even an embodied consciousness) that has value, then it seems very likely that other animals also have value because it’s pretty obvious that other animals also have minds.

Evidence that human life has value.

It seems clear enough that many people find the value of human life to be intuitive. We don’t just feel like we want to live because we are deluded or manipulated by our instincts. We feel like our lives are highly meaningful parts of the universe. I offer three intuitive illustrations.

First, a universe without consciousness would be empty and meaningless. A world full of real people with minds of their own would seem to be important unlike a world full of robots that are programmed to behave exactly like real people.

Second, consider that we value the lives of friends and strangers. When someone dies we love we experience grief; but when a stranger dies (especially a young one), we can also experience grief and mourn their death. We seem to realize that something important was lost when the person dies.

Third, it is quite possible to end one’s own life—but such a decision does not come easy. Our life can seem horrific and we usually still value it enough to keep on living. We certainly don’t think it would be right to kill miserable people just because their life is awful. We suspect that their life can be worth something even if it isn’t enjoyable. That’s not to say that suicide couldn’t possibly be a rational decision. Perhaps overwhelming pain could be worth avoiding through death in some situations.

Finally, consider how counterintuitive it would be encourage people to commit suicide when their life is miserable—especially when the miserable person is glad to be alive. This sort of behavior could even be considered to be “absurd.”

Some people will be unimpressed by our intuitions regarding human life. I have responded to some of these concerns in “Objections to Moral Realism Part 2: Intuitions are Unreliable.,” but I agree that it would be more persuasive to argue for the intrinsic value of human life without making use of intuitions.

Is there any reason to think that human life has value beyond intuition? I want to suggest that we can actually experience that human life is valuable. We know what it’s like to have a mind because that’s exactly how we know we have one in the first place. We know that having a mind involves having experiences—some are positive and some are negative. These experiences are quite complicated. A happy person can experience pain but still highly value their life overall. A miserable person can experience pleasure, but still feel unfulfilled at the end of the day.

It is our experience of our mind as having value that can cause us an experience of dread at the thought of our non-existence and permanent loss of consciousness because we know what will be lost. Many people even desire immortality in order to escape our inevitable fate. I don’t want to suggest that the desire for immortality or experience of dread at the thought of death are the wisest responses. It might be more wise to merely accept our inevitable fate and decide to “seize the day” while we still have the chance.

Although it is intuitive that human life has intrinsic value, there can be a good reason for that. It can be intuitive because we really do experience our life as having value. It can be difficult to put our experience of our own experience in words, which would explain why it is so difficult to argue that human life has value, even if it is obvious to us.

The quantity and quality of life.

To live a long life is to have a higher “quantity” of life. To save four lives by sacrificing oneself is to protect the “quantity” of life that exists. However, life can also have various qualities, and these qualities could be important in determining the value of life. The idea that all life has equal value sounds politically correct, but it can be false. (It might be that all people should have equal protection from the law, but that has little to do with their personal value.)

To have a higher “quality” of life can involve having a higher quality of consciousness. This quality can have global or local significance. The local level of consciousness is what we experience only temporarily with only having a superficial impact on our life. We can have preferable experiences that don’t last long, but we can also have preferable moods, attitudes, and states of mind that can be quite long lasting. The global level of consciousness tends to be long lasting and its elements effect many aspects of our experience. The local and global elements of our quality of life are merely two sides of a single spectrum. The local level of our consciousness tends to have less significance on our mind while the global level tends to have a highly significant impact.

Locally, we can evaluate the quality of specific short-term experiences we have—such as bodily pleasure. The value of pleasure and happiness is almost undeniable based on our own experiences of pleasure and happiness. However, it might not be that “free floating” pleasure and happiness have value. A more holistic approach could suggest that positive experiences, such as pleasure or happiness, are more valuable “qualities of life” or “states of mind.” We can evaluate the value of having a mind by what kind of a mind we are talking about. A mind that is fulfilled, happy, and experiences pleasure, could be better than a mind that doesn’t because it could have a higher quality. (A miserable mind or a mind that will experience a lot of pain might have less value.)

The classic utilitarian view would suggest that only happiness and suffering are relevant intrinsic values, but this would give the impression that a miserable life should be eliminated. If human life itself has value and a miserable life still has some value, then we can realize that our states of mind (happiness and misery) are only two aspects of our life and cannot override the value of our life.

Globally, we can evaluate the quality of a mind as a whole. For example, a higher quality of mind could be found within higher mindedness and reasonableness. There could be enlightened or philosophical minds that have developed a higher quality of being. John Stuart Mill suggested that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” and he thought this proved that some pleasures are better than others (Utilitarianism 260). The intellectual pleasure of someone like Socrates are supposed to be the best kind. However, it might be more accurate to say that Socrates’s mere existence is better than that of a fool. He might have become a higher life form than the fool. Even a miserable Socrates who rarely experiences pleasure could have more value than a fool.

Finally, Mill’s quote seems to suggest that pigs are “lower life forms.” It’s better to be a human than a pig just because we are a better sort of life form. Some life forms either have a lowly sort of consciousness or none at all, such as snails and insects. Such animals can still have intrinsic value, but the life of a human being could be higher than the value of these animals.

Should we accept that some life forms have a higher quality in the sense of being a “higher life form?” There are two important considerations. One, we don’t want the idea of “superiority” to justify immoral behavior. Two, we need to know how to justify our beliefs concerning higher and lower life forms (or global qualities of life).

Does the idea of being a higher life form justify immoral behavior? No. Such an idea is not racist because all races can include people of higher and lower qualities of life. It isn’t speciesist because we merely realize that some animals seem to have a better sort of life than others. We would have to admit that we could meet godlike aliens that could be a “higher life form” than we can be. The idea that some life forms are higher than others in no way advocates violence, oppression, or genocide—all animals have intrinsic value and should be protected.

How can we justify our belief that there are higher and lower forms of life? Mill suggested that we know that some pleasures are better than others because we have experienced them and can compare them. A competent judge can decide when one specific sort of experience is better than another because she has experienced them both. I think this is a pretty good answer. An “experience” is a form of consciousness, and a “competent judge” knows when something is a higher or lower life form by having analogous experiences of being a higher and lower life form. We start the world as children (which are lower life forms similar to nonhuman animals) and become adults (which are a higher life form).

Philosophers have rarely if ever claimed that human life has intrinsic value. Although Immanuel Kant suggested that (the humanity of) people should be treated as “ends and not merely as means,” people have “dignity,” and people “deserve respect;” it’s not entirely clear that he thinks human beings have intrinsic value. However, there is one objection I have heard to the idea that human life has intrinsic value—the Mere Addition Paradox presented by Derek Parfit. It is argued that the “mere addition of people” not a good thing.

The original paradox is based on the assumption that the more people that are happy, the better. If a population of ten happy people is good, then increasing the population by ten somewhat less happy people is better. Let’s rate the happy people as having a total of “10 happiness points” and the less people as having a total of “5 happiness points.” However, in that case a population of twenty people who are somewhat happy has even more value (that has a happiness rating of 8 each). This third group would be said to be less happy than the first group, but larger. Many people find that to be counterintuitive. They think that the third group is clearly worse than the first. Perhaps they think it’s unfair to sacrifice the happiness of a small population in order to have a larger population.

We could even give a more extreme example. Is a population of one million very happy people (worth a total of one million happiness points) of less value than a population of ten million slightly happy people (worth a total of one million and one happiness points)? Many people that to be absurd. They think the very happy population would be preferable. Parfit would say that the population of ten million people are living “gravely deficient” lives.

How does this relate to the value of human life? If all human life has value, then increasing the population is supposed to be good. That’s supposed to be really silly for some reason, but I like the idea of expanding the human empire to other worlds, like in Star Trek. I don’t see a big problem here.

Perhaps the concern is ultimately that encouraging the human population to increase would end up encouraging overpopulation. However, I don’t see this as a problem because “overpopulation” has to do with making existing life forms less happy. The only reason to say that we can experience “overpopulation” is that a population that gets too large can destroy the environment and use up the worlds resources. That can cause suffering and death that obviously matter in their own right.

Some utilitarians embraced “average utilitarianism” in order to avoid the “mere addition” paradox, which is the view that the average happiness of a population is what has value rather than the total happiness of everyone (which is called “total utilitarianism”). These utilitarians would say that a population of ten very happy people is better than a population of eleven people when one of those people is only slightly happy, and the rest are very happy.

I personally don’t find the “mere addition” paradox to be counterintuitive. I have three responses to the paradox:

One, Parfit basically wants to deny that a “life worth living” is really “worth living.” We shouldn’t want people to be around, even if their life is worth living—unless it isn’t “gravely deficient.” Instead, it should be a proper sort of life. This is a strange position and it sounds to me like Parfit is playing with words. Either the lives we are discussing are worth living or they are gravely deficient.

Two, a life held by a population that is “gravely deficient” is likely to be harming previously existing lifeforms. More resources would be available to those life forms if less children were born. Having children could actually harm other people and animals in an unacceptable way in such a situation. It is this unacceptable behavior that should give us disgust rather than the population of human beings who merely exist minding their own business.

Three, the lives of the entire human population seems to have been “gravely deficient” throughout most of history, but it seems strange to condemn people for having children when they are merely unfortunate for living in a time with few resources and so little technology. If the remaining survivors of the human race will live in such a condition, this would certainly seem better than extinction.


The view that human life has value is uncontroversial, but to say that it has intrinsic value is a neglected controversial topic within the academic philosophical community. Nonetheless, the idea that we have intrinsic value is an intuitive view and much of our thoughts and behavior are based on the assumption that we do—such as the belief that killing people is almost always wrong. Moreover, it is quite possible that we can experience our own life as having value. Finally, I know of no major objections to the view that we have intrinsic value that I find persuasive.

I realize that I have not proven in a satisfying way that we have intrinsic value, but evaluating our own experiences is not an easy task and the implications of our experiences are not easy to determine. We all accept that seeing an apple is a good reason to believe that an apple exists in front of your eyes. I have argued that we experience that pain is intrinsically bad based on our experiences of pain. (If my argument failed, then I suspect that we experience that at least some pain is intrinsically bad.) Now we can decide if we experience our own life as having value and if we have any reason to trust such an experience.

Updated (3/18/2013): Some minor changes, and an improved discussion of Parfit’s objection.



  1. these article has a beautifull insight and i just wanna say gud job

    Comment by Owen — December 16, 2010 @ 8:47 pm | Reply

  2. […] value of human life seems to be greater than the “usefulness” of human life. It’s good to exist. You have value, […]

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  3. […] Moral duty is an ambiguous term that can have different meanings. My preferred definition is “what should be done due to the great importance (intrinsic value) involved when it’s not too difficult to do it.” Duties are owed to people and other sentient beings either because they or their conscious states have intrinsic value. For example, you have a duty not to kill people because their life has intrinsic value. […]

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  4. On an atheistic worldview, do you believe that there are things which possess infinite, intrinsic value?

    Comment by philosopher145 — December 21, 2011 @ 3:31 am | Reply

    • I believe some things have intrinsic value, but I don’t know if anything has infinite intrinsic value. What would that mean? I don’t see any way to “measure” or “compare” things that have intrinsic value.

      Comment by JW Gray — December 21, 2011 @ 6:53 am | Reply

    • Atheistic worldview is a naturalistic explanation of current world affairs which inhibit on the religious folk universally. Atheism is a reflection of hard, cold calculated facts which is good but in itself is not good for the value of human life. We are here to live and die with no other explanation. Atheism is a religion in the sense that to be an athesit you must have a LOT of faith.

      Comment by Roger Squarepants — March 28, 2012 @ 6:51 pm | Reply

      • Roger Squarepants,

        Atheistic worldview is a naturalistic explanation of current world affairs which inhibit on the religious folk universally.

        What does that mean?

        Atheism is a reflection of hard, cold calculated facts which is good but in itself is not good for the value of human life.

        Why not?

        We are here to live and die with no other explanation.

        This statement doesn’t make sense, but I think the point you want to make is that there is no divine reason for living and dying, according to atheists. However, I don’t think atheists should need a divine reason for living or dying.

        Atheism is a religion in the sense that to be an athesit you must have a LOT of faith.

        Prove it.

        I deleted several of your posts because they appeared to be mostly just nonsense with no intention to engage in a conversation. That is not appropriate here.

        Comment by JW Gray — March 28, 2012 @ 8:38 pm

  5. My goodness, where you find such a level of mental arrogance and disconnection from the life process around you, I cannot imagine.

    Comment by David Bromfield — January 23, 2012 @ 12:13 am | Reply

    • What are you talking about? If I made a poor argument, then where is the error in my reasoning?

      Comment by JW Gray — January 23, 2012 @ 5:05 am | Reply

  6. There is a Truth in Mahabharatha, the great Epic in India; If u donot like something done by others u should not do to others. that is the paramadharma[great Duty] A very simple selfanalysis

    Comment by m.narayana rao — August 23, 2012 @ 5:02 am | Reply

    • How does that relate to the issue here? Why shouldn’t we treat other people badly?

      Comment by JW Gray — August 23, 2012 @ 5:16 am | Reply

  7. From an argumentative standpoint, I feel like you’re a bit scattered and inconclusive in your argument. That said, I’m very curious to find out what you meant by a number of these statements. Did you mean to say that human life has intrinsic, uninfringable value, unquantifiable by utilitarianism, or that it has intrinsic value that *is* quantifiable?

    Comment by Max P — October 24, 2012 @ 4:57 pm | Reply

    • I said that I was interested in the issue concerning if human life has intrinsic value in the section, “What it means for human life to have value.” I don’t know what “uninfringable value” is. The value of human life might not be something we can compare very well to the pleasure or happiness that classic utiltarians are interested in. However, the value of human life might exist precisely because of the pleasure or happiness we experience. Human life is quantifiable. We can say two lives is more than one, that living for two minutes is more than living for one minute. However, it is possible that it is certain things that make a human life have value that would make it difficult or impossible to say how much a human life is worth. I don’t trust any measurement of human life in terms of a number. The same goes for the value of pleasure and pain.

      Even so, we do have preferences and think those preferences are justified based on our experiences. I prefer to be free than to be captured and tortured. I think it is obvious that it is really better in terms of human experience to be free in that case. We can often safely say that two lives are better than one and so on.

      I did not resolve every issue, and that might be why you felt it was scattered.

      Comment by JW Gray — October 24, 2012 @ 5:53 pm | Reply

      • Yeah, that clarified things, I think. To sum it up, human life has intrinsic value not because of some potential amount of dollars that they might be worth, but because they have the capacity for good experience and that itself is valuable. Is that a fair summary?

        If so, I think you and my personal form of utilitarianism are on the same page. It’s always bothered me that utilitarians so infrequently consider the future, and the potential for more good experiences. Like, utilitarians say “if it’s more bad than good, it should not be” but in the case of people questioning suicide, just because their life is more bad than good now does not mean there is no chance for them to increase the total amount of good to bring their lives back to goodness, or at least balance. On the other hand, if someone is suffering and in their terminal days, they might as well be given the freedom to end their own suffering, as they have very little potential for more happiness compared to suffering.

        To sum up what I’m saying, a vessel that has the capacity to increase overall goodness is to be valued for that potential.

        P.s. by uninfringable I meant inalienable. An end-all be-all ultimatum about the “Sanctity” of life.

        Comment by Max P — October 25, 2012 @ 1:37 pm

      • I didn’t actually say why human life has intrinsic value here. I was not saying that life has value just for having a heart pump blood, but I did imply that having a mind and experiences might have value in and of themselves. I leave open the possibility that neutral experiences (neither good nor bad) might also have intrinsic value.

        I know of a paper that recently argued that human life has no value (even in terms of consciousness):

        However, the point of that paper seems to imply that a mind with no experience would have no value. I never said a mind of no experience would have value. The question is if any human life has value, and if so, why. I personally suspect that experience can have value, even if it’s not necessarily “happy” or “pleasurable.” As stated above, a life that has more pain than pleasure still seems like it has value.

        Consider a person who wants to commit suicide because she’s in pain. She is probably in so much pain that she doesn’t want to have to deal with it. If she knows that the future will have a lot less pain obviously that should be relevant to her decision. Even so, people who merely experience more pain than pleasure (of a mild variety) don’t seem to be very driven to suicide. I think most of us would rather live, even if more pain is involved than pleasure. That doesn’t seem irrational. It seems more irrational to say it would have been better to have never lived than to live that kind of a life.

        Comment by JW Gray — October 26, 2012 @ 7:47 am

  8. […] Does human life have value? this post here goes more into the essential value of the human life over an animals and has some very strong points. […]

    Pingback by Human Life vs Animal Life | arronlovseyanderson — February 23, 2015 @ 6:04 pm | Reply

  9. You should probably have looked up the definition of the word “value” before you started writing this. Or at least tried to define it yourself. The way you use it doesn’t seem to make much sense. And marrying it to the word intrinsic especially doesn’t make any sense. The only places I could find the term “Intrinsic value” used was in business and finance. Is this what you based the text on human life on? Even their definition seems to at least acknowledge how there are different kinds of values like; “market value” or an “underlying perception of its true value” (they at least seem to understand the definition of the word).

    Comment by Leon Skog (@LeonGSkog) — April 4, 2016 @ 11:20 am | Reply

    • I suspect philosophers have used the term “intrinsic value” before finance, and the concept was discussed by many moral philosophers throughout history. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Utilitarians all discussed it. Here’s the Stanford Encyclopedia article on “intrinsic value vs extrinsic value. I don’t know why you think my discussion is particularly confusing, but I would like to make it more clear if I can figure out how.

      Part of the point of intrinsic value is to explain how an action can be worth doing or worth desiring in a more satisfying way. You can go to work to make money, make money to get what you need to live, and live to work, but that doesn’t explain why any of these actions are really worth doing because none of those actions are done because they really matter on their own (in this example). They are done just to get something else. If no action is done because of intrinsic value, then we can argue nothing is really worth doing. This is perhaps an oversimplification, but it is kind of the main idea I am getting at.

      I realize the concept of intrinsic value can be confusing in various ways and I wrote a FAQ to help clarify the way I understand it.

      Comment by JW Gray — April 4, 2016 @ 6:41 pm | Reply

  10. interesting read… definitely a topic that is fun to explore. I’ve also been exploring the idea of bestowing intrinsic value to life… but life that extends beyond humans. You might find it interesting….

    Comment by Mariko Margetson — June 21, 2016 @ 3:53 am | Reply

    • I agree that it extends beyond humans and the discussion here is highly incomplete as well. However, it is really hard to come up with a satisfying argument.

      Comment by JW Gray — June 22, 2016 @ 1:29 am | Reply

  11. Good read, John, though I can’t say I really agree with it. I realize in your FAQ (Q 12, the “sadist” question) that you’re separating pleasure from questions of morality. Still, if “pleasure is only one element that we take into consideration when we make moral decisions”, the other factors including the consequent suffering of another, then doesn’t preventing or reversing suffering takes moral priority over pleasure. How can it be right to hurt, harm, or degrade the dignity of someone if the pleasure resulting from it (end or means) causes a very unpleasant state of affairs to others? In fact, preventing highly unpleasant states of affairs for others seems a huge part of the reason moral rules (and hence morality) exists at all – some of them even codified into law. In the end, I have to hold that pleasure may have intrinsic value, but it has overall value to the world only to the extent that it doesn’t hurt, harm, or degrade the dignity of others.

    Moving back up to the reasons you give for human life to have value: The first one I can’t go along with, for why does the universe have to have value? Save for conscious living matter, it doesn’t feel or even have needs at all. So It seems value needs to exist only to the extent that it counteracts disvalue. No bad exists means no actual need for goodness to exist either. The second one has to do with the death of a close one (family or friend), an erasure of their future personal companionship so deeply felt that its permanent negation from any future time leaves us in great anguish. It also means no further suffering prevention or mitigations for others from that person. This response also applies to your third point (suicide). While I agree some pains are so intense that no person would want that kind of anguish for themselves, I also say that a life doesn’t have to be overall “net pleasurable” to be worth living. If suicide causes more anguish than other causes of death (this seems usually the case), then I would say life is still worth enduring for the sake of others, and as said just now, endure badness for the sake of preventing even worse badless from overtaking others.

    I don’t know how you would label my philosophy (I don’t claim to subscribe to a particular one), this is my take on the matter. Good, stimulating read, regardless.

    Comment by Brister595 (@brister595) — October 21, 2016 @ 8:35 am | Reply

    • First, the question about sadism and masochism does not require any particular answer to be correct for pleasure and pain to have intrinsic value. I don’t think you understood my point. What exactly did I say and what do you think the problem is.

      I can try to describe what my point probably was a bit. I think watching horror movies is more fun when they cause fear. Fear is a negative emotion, but being “fun” is pleasure. So, watching the movies seems worth it because the pleasure seems more important than any negative emotions involved to me. The fear could be seen as a bad thing by itself and it would not make for a worthwhile experience if it was not needed to have the pleasure or enjoyment for the movie. If the movie produces fear and no enjoyment, then it’s pointless.

      Going to the dentist is painful, but it doesn’t degrade anyone and violates no dignity. It is a consensual transaction that is only worth it because it’s not just a painful experience. We think there’s something good about it. We only think going to the dentist is worth it because of some expected benefits. If it causes pain and gives no benefits, then it’s not worth it.

      Second, the arguments regarding human life having value does not require that human life has intrinsic value. There are other types of value. Human life seems like a good thing in certain ways. Whether or not it has intrinsic value is of course very related to the post, but the universe does not have to have intrinsic value either. I don’t know why you even mentioned that idea. And if human life has no consciousness, then that doesn’t seem to have intrinsic value. The type of human life I am talking about is basically one with personhood status — rationality, thoughts, a mind, etc. And a lot of the ordinary experiences we should expect to have as humans.

      So, if we see that human life has different kinds of value — that it’s good in certain ways — then I do think there’s evidence that it has intrinsic value because other types of value don’t seem to explain all the ways human life seems to be a good thing.

      I don’t know exactly what points you are arguing against that I make. Show me the actual argument that I make and I can respond better.

      So It seems value needs to exist only to the extent that it counteracts disvalue. No bad exists means no actual need for goodness to exist either.

      I’m not sure why you say that, but one way bad things can exist is by destroying good things.

      The second one has to do with the death of a close one (family or friend), an erasure of their future personal companionship so deeply felt that its permanent negation from any future time leaves us in great anguish. It also means no further suffering prevention or mitigations for others from that person. This response also applies to your third point (suicide).

      Of course. Is that the only bad thing about it, though?

      While I agree some pains are so intense that no person would want that kind of anguish for themselves, I also say that a life doesn’t have to be overall “net pleasurable” to be worth living. If suicide causes more anguish than other causes of death (this seems usually the case), then I would say life is still worth enduring for the sake of others, and as said just now, endure badness for the sake of preventing even worse badless from overtaking others.

      So is death only bad when it causes suffering or causes a loss of future pleasure? If we can press a button to destroy all life instantaneously, would that be okay as long as the amount of pain was going to continue to be higher than the amount of pleasure?

      I think my point was that one person can correctly know that their own life is worth living, even if they will experience more pain than pleasure (which I think is usually the case actually). I don’t think suicide is the best option for that person — and only wrong as long as it would cause suffering to others (or a lack of pleasure to others).

      I don’t know how you would label my philosophy (I don’t claim to subscribe to a particular one), this is my take on the matter. Good, stimulating read, regardless.

      If you think the only value to life is pleasure to oneself and others, then you are a classical utilitarian. You might like to read John Stewart Mill’s Utilitarianism. Glad you enjoyed the read!

      Comment by JW Gray — October 21, 2016 @ 8:53 am | Reply

  12. This is very interesting.
    Reading primatologist Franz de Waal’s book “Our Inner Ape” it seems we are the most virtuous and the most evil species on Earth, so from a moral perspective I think we are overall of neural value overall , it s a bell curve with everything it seems, for instance there are a few purely psychopathic people and actions, a few purely empathetic ones with the vast majority in the pragmatic middle, neutral, average.

    So I think humanity as a whole has no intrinsic value, it would not be good or bad if we went extinct (which is likely), it would be in the middle, wouldn’t matter either way, morally. I think the only reason it is not normally ok for one person to kill another person is because we are no better than them, are of equal, neutral value therefore in no position to make such judgments and take such actions.
    That’s my thoughts, at least when I’ve had a bad day.

    Comment by David Nich — August 5, 2017 @ 9:38 pm | Reply

    • Most people do not think intrinsic value depends on being virtuous. Arguably no species is virtuous, so does that mean it doesn’t matter when we kill animals or cause extinctions for no good reason?

      And if humans aren’t virtuous, does that mean it’s okay to cause them needless suffering and death as well?

      Comment by JW Gray — August 5, 2017 @ 10:17 pm | Reply

  13. Thanks for thought-provoking reply.

    I did say “humanity as a whole has no intrinsic value” but I shouldn’t have, I was having a bad day, I actually think we probably have neutral or average value (as I indicated elsewhere) overall.

    I’m actually not sure what intrinsic value is, I’m inclined to see causing suffering or injury to others as evil, bad or worthless, the opposite as good, worthwhile, animals and plants do these things, they don’t do them consciously which might be called “virtuous” (this choice of words was also a little careless,I just mean good, beneficial)

    I think many plants and animals may do much more good than evil in the world, such as bees perhaps, they might be of greater overall value than us despite being less intelligent and powerful, so we should not kill them.

    Comment by David Nich — August 8, 2017 @ 12:48 am | Reply

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