Objections to Moral Realism Part 4: Moral Beliefs Can’t Motivate

There is evidence that moral values involve desires. When we say “human life has intrinsic value,” we expect a desire to promote human life and a pro-attitude towards human life. The connection between moral beliefs and desires is not clear, and some people have argued that morality is only about desires. If morality is only about desires, then we should reject the existence of intrinsic values. Our intrinsic value beliefs would merely state our desires. These concerns reflect Humean psychology, which states that there are beliefs and desires, and beliefs can’t motivate. Mark Platts, John Searle, and others have disputed Humean psychology. Although not all philosophers agree with Humean psychology, I will not question it here. Instead, I will attempt to prove that Humean psychology is compatible with moral realism.

Objections to Moral Realism Part 3: Argument from Queerness

If morality is irreducible to nonmoral facts, it might still be part of the materialist worldview like any other domain, but we would merely be unable to fully describe morality in nonmoral terms. (To say that moral facts are reducible is to say that we can find out that moral facts “are really something else.”) I have argued that morality must be irreducible, but this is a substantial metaphysical claim. Such a metaphysical claim must be especially justified due to Occam’s razor: We must not multiply entities beyond necessity. (Or, more specifically, we shouldn’t multiply irreducible domains of reality beyond necessity.) I will present three objections against the claim that morality is irreducible, then I will attempt to reply to those objections in order to show them to be unconvincing. In particular I want to show that morality’s irreducibility is just as justified as psychology’s irreducibility, that we have reason to believe psychology is irreducible, and that we have more reason to accept that morality is irreducible than to reject it.

Objections to Moral Realism Part 2: Intuition is Unreliable

Many ethicists agree that moral philosophy requires the use of intuition. My argument for moral realism itself requires the use of intuition. However, philosophers will require that we justify our use of intuition. Some philosophers have argued that intuition is too mysterious or unreliable to be used for philosophy. I will present the case that intuition represents our tendency to be unable to verbalize various justifications. I will explain how our intuitions make use of relatively reliable justifications, consider four objections against intuition, and I will attempt to explain why the objections are not convincing.

Note that I am not an expert of intuition and I have read relatively little on the subject. Still, the little that I do know can clarify some issues people tend to have concerning intuitions, and I am able to respond to superficial objections.

Objections to Moral Realism Part 1: The Is/Ought Gap

Although I have already discussed several objections to moral realism, some of them are worth discussing in more detail. In particular, the is/ought gap has proven to be a source of confusion. The is/ought gap is ambiguous and there are at least two main interpretations: One is ontological and one is epistemological. In other words, one says that the is/ought gap is a description of reality and another says that it is a description of our evidence.

An Argument for Moral Realism

There is more work to be done in order to prove that moral realism is plausible. Perhaps the best way to contribute to the plausibility of moral realism is to take a closer look at our actual moral experiences. I will attempt to show that moral realism can make more sense out of our moral experiences than anti-realism. If the anti-realist can’t make sense out of our experiences, but moral realism can, that will give us some reason to prefer moral realism. In particular, an understanding of our pain experiences is best understood in light of it having intrinsic disvalue.

A Moral Anti-Realist Perspective

There are many different moral anti-realist perspectives. On one extreme an anti-realist could just say that morality is entirely delusional. Nothing matters. Go ahead and do whatever you want. This perspective is not very satisfying and it certainly won’t satisfy anyone who finds moral realism to be worthy of consideration. On the other hand an anti-realist could try to preserve our ethical beliefs, intuitions, and experiences without claiming that morality is irreducible. Morality is part of our lives, but it might be reducible to our psychology and culture. This is a kind of constructivist perspective, and it is the kind of perspective that I will present here. Constructivists believe that morality is in some sense constructed (created) by people. We have moral rules because we tend to agree to them. (Constructivism can be compatible with cultural relativism, which states that moral statements are true when they are approved of within a culture.)

I will attempt to relate anti-realism to our everyday life and experiences by discussing how an anti-realist perspective will relate to moral knowledge, reality, and psychology.

A Moral Realist Perspective

In order to relate moral realism to everyday life, let’s take a look at how a moral realist can view moral knowledge, reality, and psychology. I am not going to argue that this is the best perspective of moral realism possible. It is merely an example of a perspective.

What is Moral Realism?

Before I create an argument that Moral Realism is plausible, I want to take a close look at what exactly Moral Realism and Anti-Realism entail. First, I will take a look at what moral realism and anti-realism mean. How do we know if someone is a moral realist or not? I will later take a look at what it would be like to adopt a moral realist or anti-realist perspective. We need to know how these perspectives relate to everyday life.

Contemporary Metaethics Part 1 Ebook PDF

I organized my reviews and opinions in a free ebook (PDF file). All of the reviews and opinions are from this website, but someone might find it convenient to be able to view it as an ebook. It discusses the basics of metaethics and provides several reviews of contemporary essays.

I spent a couple of hours to make the ebook. Several typos were fixed, but there are probably a lot more. Formatting is not as consistent as I would like, but I don’t want to spend a lot of time on it. My opinions involving metaethics are also inconsistent because I wrote my reviews within a stream of consciousness. I often changed my mind one day to the next based on the readings.

You might want to right click/save as to download to ebook.

Download the Ebook

On another note, you can discuss this website and get updates about it on Ethical Realism’s facebook fan page.

Contemporary Metaethics Part 1 Table of Contents

I have finished reviewing Essays on Moral Realism edited by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. This is a table of contents for my reviews and thoughts related to that anthology.