I made two images concerning creationist arguments and I will explain why these arguments fail in greater detail below.
October 3, 2012
September 8, 2009
Tags: moral antirealism, moral realism, morality, naturalism, perspective, science, scientific, world view
Naturalists believe that science is the most appropriate way to learn about the world and tend to be materialists, and they are the dominant philosophical community. Naturalism has its origins in empiricism and science: We wanted a way to learn about the world without prejudice and fantasy. Philosophy and religion tends to suffer from our psychological tendency to see the world in human psychological terms. There has to be a “reason” for everything to happen in the sense that there has to be a motive. The scientific process offered a way to avoid anthropomorphizing the world by reducing everything to thoughtless bits of matter. (We might start to worry when scientists offer us a non-anthropomorphic understanding of human beings and try to reduce us to thoughtless bits of matter.) (more…)
June 21, 2009
Tags: argument, critique, evidence, evil, explanation, good, goodness, justification, moral realism, naturalism, observation, science
Many philosophers of our past wanted philosophy to be as much like mathematics as possible. That would give us the highest form of knowledge and certainty. This task is now considered unrealistic. Instead, philosophers want philosophy to be as much like natural science as possible. Nicholas L Sturgeon provides an argument that ethics can be like science because moral facts can have causal power and can therefore be necessary facts in determining our observations. (more…)
May 24, 2009
Tags: argument, critique, evidence, evil, explanation, good, goodness, justification, moral antirealism, moral realism, morality, naturalism, objections, observation, science
Objections to Moral Realism
In order to show that moral realism can be appealing, Boyd must first show why moral realism isn’t unappealing.
Right now moral antirealism is popular and there are many objections people give to moral realism in order to prove that realism is implausible. Boyd considers several objections and shows how the same kinds of objections could be used against scientific realism, but would fail. Boyd will argue that these objections fail against moral realism for the same reason that they would fail against scientific realism.
This section will only discuss the objections to moral realism. The next section will be Boyd’s response to the objections. (more…)
May 11, 2009
Tags: argument, critique, electrons, entities, evidence, evil, explanation, good, goodness, justification, moral antirealism, moral realism, morality, naturalism, observation, science
We need to know how we thought of moral ideas, like good and bad. If we just made it up, then we should be moral antirealists. If we discovered that things can really be good or bad, then we should be moral realists.
If you think electrons are real, then you are a scientific realist. Entities theorized about science can be real despite the fact that we can’t experience the entities with our five senses. There are very plausible philosophical arguments that we should be scientific realists. Richard Boyd argues that in order to understand a plausible account of moral realism, we should understand a plausible account of scientific realism. (more…)
February 22, 2009
Tags: argument, critique, entities, evidence, evil, good, goodness, justification, morality, nihilism, observation, science
Harman examines whether or not we can “observe” moral facts in the sense that we can observe scientific facts (119). If so, we can treat ethics as a natural science. Harman’s essay is related to a very important philosophical problem: Is the truth about moral facts relevant to our beliefs about moral facts? If our moral beliefs are unrelated to the truth about moral facts, then we have little reason to trust our moral beliefs. (more…)